Naive Diversification Preferences and their Representation by de Giorgi, Enrico & Mahmoud, Ola
Naive Diversification Preferences and their
Representation
Enrico G. De Giorgi∗ Ola Mahmoud†
October 11, 2018‡
Abstract
A widely applied diversification paradigm is the naive diversification choice heuris-
tic. It stipulates that an economic agent allocates equal decision weights to given
choice alternatives independent of their individual characteristics. This article pro-
vides mathematically and economically sound choice theoretic foundations for the
naive approach to diversification. We axiomatize naive diversification by defining
it as a preference for equality over inequality, derive its relationship to the classical
diversification paradigm, and provide a utility representation. In particular, we (i)
prove that the notion of permutation invariance lies at the core of naive diversifica-
tion and that an economic agent is a naive diversifier if and only if his preferences are
convex and permutation invariant; (ii) derive necessary and sufficient conditions on
the utility functions that give rise to preferences for naive diversification; (iii) show
that naive diversification preferences arise when decision makers only consider beliefs
that imply some weak form of independence, which is closely related to correlation
neglect.
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1 Introduction
Diversification is one of the cornerstones of decision making in economics and finance. In
its essence, it conveys the idea of choosing variety over similarity. Informally, one might
say that the goal behind introducing variety through diversification is the reduction of
risk or uncertainty, and so one might identify a diversifying decision maker with a risk
averse one. This is indeed the case in the expected utility theory (EUT) of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), where risk aversion and preference for diversification are exactly
captured by the concavity of the utility function which the decision maker is maximizing.
However, this equivalence fails to hold in more general models of choice, as shown by De
Giorgi and Mahmoud (2016).
In the context of portfolio construction, standard economic theory postulates that an
investor should optimize amongst various choice alternatives by maximizing portfolio re-
turn while minimizing portfolio risk, given by the return variance (Markowitz 1952). In
practice, however, these traditional optimization approaches to choice are plagued by tech-
nical difficulties.1 Experimental work in the decades after the emergence of the classical
theories of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Markowitz (1952) has shown that
economic agents in reality systematically violate the traditional diversification assump-
tion when choosing among risky gambles. Indeed, seminal psychological and behavioral
economics research by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) (see also Simon (1955) and Simon
(1979)) suggests that the portfolio construction task may be too complex for decision mak-
ers to perform. Consequently, investors adopt various types of simplified diversification
paradigms in practice.
One of the most widely applied such simple rules of choice is the so-called naive diver-
sification heuristic. It stipulates that an economic agent allocates equal weights among
a given choice set, independent of the individual characteristics of the underlying choice
alternatives. In the context of portfolio construction, this rule is often referred to as the
equal-weighted or 1/n strategy. This naive diversification paradigm goes as far back as
the Talmud, where the relevant passage states that “it is advisable for one that he should
divide his money in three parts, one of which he shall invest in real estate, one of which
in business, and the third part to remain always in his hands” (Duchin and Levy 2009).
It is documented that even Harry Markowitz used the simple 1/n heuristic when he made
his own retirement investments. He justifies his choice on psychological grounds: “My
intention was to minimize my future regret. So I split my contributions fifty-fifty between
bonds and equities” (Gigerenzer 2010).
1These difficulties are stemming from the instability of the optimization problem with respect to the
available data. As is the case with any economic model, the true parameters are unknown and need to be
estimated, hence resulting in uncertainty and estimation error. For a discussion of the problems arising
in implementing mean-variance optimal portfolios, see for example Hodges and Brealy (1978), Best and
Grauer (1991), Michaud (1998), and Litterman (2003).
2
1.1 Towards choice-theoretic foundations
The word naive inherently implies a lack of sophistication. Indeed, naive diversification is
widely viewed as an anomaly linked to irrational behavior that does not assure sensible or
coherent decision making. In its essence, the naive diversification paradigm is considered a
simple and practical rule of thumb with no economic foundation guaranteeing its optimal-
ity. Moreover, despite the large experimental and empirical evidence of the prevalence and
outperformance of naive diversification, a formal descriptive choice theoretic or economic
model does not seem to exist.
With the purpose of filling this gap, this paper provides a mathematically and eco-
nomically sound choice theoretic formalization of the naive approach to diversification of
decision makers and investors. To this end, we axiomatize naive diversification by framing
it as a choice theoretic preference for equality over inequality, which has a utility represen-
tation, and derive its relationship to the classical diversification paradigm. The crux of our
choice theoretic axiomatization of the naive diversification heuristic lies in the idea that
equality is preferred over inequality, a concept that is simultaneously simple and complex,
as put by Sen (1973): “At one level, it is the simplest of all ideas and has moved people
with an immediate appeal hardly matched by any other concept. At another level, however,
it is an exceedingly complex notion which makes statements of inequality highly problem-
atic, and it has been, therefore, the subject of much research by philosophers, statisticians,
political theorists, sociologists and economists.” We complement this line of research from
a decision theoretic perspective by using the mathematical concept of majorization to
describe a preference relation which exhibits preference for naive diversification. Histori-
cally, majorization has been used to describe inequality orderings in the economic context
of inequality of income, as developed by both Lorenz (1905) and Dalton (1920).2
The goal of our choice-theoretic approach is threefold. First, our main objective is to
develop an axiomatic system that precisely captures widely observed regularities of behav-
ior. We thus provide a formal descriptive model of what is considered to be an anomalous
yet strongly prevalent paradigm such as naive diversification. Second, this axiomatic de-
scriptive model enables us to gain novel insights into the nature of the preferences and the
utility of the naive diversifier. In particular, by relating it to other known axiomatized
behavioral paradigms, we show that preferences for naive diversification are equivalent to
convex preferences that additionally exhibit an indifference among the choice alternatives,
which is formalized via a notion of permutation invariance. We also show preferences for
naive diversification arise when naive diversifiers treat assets as being conditionally inde-
pendent and identically distributed, which implies that they exhibit a level of correlation
neglect.
Finally, one may use the axioms underlying naive diversification to test the behavioral
drivers of this choice heuristic in reality. For example, one of our axioms, that of permuta-
2We refer the reader to Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011) for a comprehensive self-contained account
of the theory and applications of majorization.
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tion invariance, implies that the given alternatives are considered in some way symmetric
or equivalent by the naive decision maker. This is an axiom that can be directly tested
in, say, an experimental setting by relating it to Laplace’s principle of indifference and
varying the amount of information available for each of the choice alternatives.
1.2 Synopsis
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some principles
related to naive diversification and provides an overview of the evidence of both naive
diversification and correlation neglect in the real world. Section 3 sets up the choice theo-
retic framework in the Anscombe-Aumann setting and provides the necessary background
on majorization and doubly stochastic matrices, both of which are fundamental concepts
in our development. Section 4 presents an axiomatic formalization of naive diversification
preferences and derives its relationship to the traditional (convex) diversification axiom.
We then show that the notion of permutation invariance lies at the core of our definition
and that a preference relation exhibits preference for naive diversification if and only if it is
convex and permutation invariant. In Section 5, we provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions on the utility functions that give rise to preferences for naive diversification. Section
A considers two potentially useful applications of our formalism, namely comparison of
levels of naive diversification and rebalancing of allocation to equality.
2 Background
2.1 Related principles
Naive diversification implies a preference of equality over inequality in the choice weights.
One of the earliest, closely related hypotheses concerning decisions under subjective un-
certainty is the principle of insufficient reason, also called the principle of indifference. It
is generally attributed to Bernoulli (1738) and invoked by Bayes (1763) in his development
of the binomial theorem. The principle states that in situations where there is no logical
or empirical reason to favor any one of a set of mutually exclusive events or choices over
any other, one should assign them all equal probability. In Bayesian probability, this is
the simplest non-informative prior.
Outside the choice theoretic framework, the notion of preference of equality over in-
equality dominates several prominent problems in economic theory. Early in the twentieth
century, economists became interested in measuring inequality of incomes or wealth. More
specifically, it became desirable to determine how income or wealth distributions might
be compared in order to say that one distribution was more equal than another. The first
discussion of this kind was provided by Lorenz (1905). He suggested a graphical manner
in which to compare inequality in finite populations in terms of nested curves. If total
wealth is uniformly distributed, the so-called Lorenz curve is a straight line. With an
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unequal distribution, the curves will always begin and end in the same points as with an
equal distribution, but they will be bent in the middle. The rule of interpretation, as he
puts it, is: as the bow is bent, concentration increases. Later, Dalton (1920) described
the closely related principle of transfers. Under the theoretical proposition of a positive
functional relationship between income and economic welfare, stating that economic wel-
fare increases at an exponentially decreasing rate with increased income, Dalton concludes
that maximum social welfare is achievable only when all incomes are equal. Following a
suggestion by Pigou (1912), he proposed the condition that a transfer of income from a
richer to a poorer person, so long as that transfer does not reverse the ranking of the two,
will result in greater equity. Such an operation, involving the shifting of wealth from one
individual to a relatively poorer individual, is known as the Pigou-Dalton transfer and has
also been labeled as a Robin Hood transfer. The seminal ideas of Lorenz (1905) and Dalton
(1920) will be referenced frequently throughout our development of naive diversification
preferences, as the mathematical framework upon which we rely coincides with theoretical
formalizations of the Lorenz curve and the Dalton transfer.
2.2 Experimental and empirical evidence of naive diversification
Academics and practitioners have long studied the occurrence of naive diversification,
along with its downside and potential benefits. Some of the first academic demonstrations
of naive diversification as a choice heuristic were made by Simonson (1990) in marketing in
the context of consumption decisions by individuals, and by Read and Loewenstein (1995)
in the context of experimental psychology. In the context of economic and financial decision
making, empirical evidence suggests behavior which is consistent with naive diversification.
For instance, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) turned to study whether the effect manifests itself
among investors making decisions in the context of defined contribution saving plans. Their
experimental evidence suggests that some people spread their contributions evenly across
the investment options irrespective of the particular mix of options. The authors point out
that while naive diversification can produce a “reasonable portfolio”, it affects the resulting
asset allocation and can be costly. In particular, people might choose a portfolio that is not
on the efficient frontier, or they might pick the wrong point along the frontier. Moreover, it
does not assure sensible or coherent decision making. Subsequently, Huberman and Jiang
(2006) find that participants tend to invest in only a small number of the funds offered
to them, and that they tend to allocate their contributions evenly across the funds that
they use, with this tendency weakening with the number of funds used. More recently,
Baltussen and Post (2011) find strong evidence for what they coin as irrational behavior.
Their subjects follow a conditional naive diversification heuristic as they exclude the assets
with an unattractive marginal distribution and divide the available funds equally between
the remaining, attractive assets. This strategy is applied even if it leads to allocations that
are dominated in terms of first-order stochastic dominance – hence the term irrational.
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Irrationality has been since then frequently used to describe naive diversification behavior.
In Fernandes (2013), the naive diversification bias of Benartzi and Thaler (2001) was
replicated across different samples using a within-participant manipulation of portfolio
options. It was found that the more investors use intuitive judgments, the more likely
they are to display the naive diversification bias.
In the context of portfolio construction, naive diversification has enjoyed a revival dur-
ing the last few years because of its simplicity on one hand and the empirical evidence
on the other hand suggesting superior performance compared to traditional diversifica-
tion schemes. In addition to the relative outperformance, the empirical stability of the
naive 1/n diversification rule has made it particularly attractive in practice, as — unlike
Markowitz’s risk minimization strategies — it does not rely on unknown correlation pa-
rameters that need to be estimated from data. Moreover, its outperformance has been
investigated and a range of reasons have been proposed for why naive diversification may
outperform other diversification paradigms. The most widely documented of these is the
so-called small-cap-effect within the universe of equities. This theory stipulates that stocks
with smaller market capitalization tend to ourperform larger stocks, and by construction,
naive diversification gives more exposure to smaller cap stocks compared to capitalization
weighting. Empirical support for the superior performance of equal weighted portfolios
relative to capitalization weighting include Lessard (1976), Roll (1981), Ohlson and Rosen-
berg (1982), Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Kora-
jczyk and Sadka (2004), Hamza, Kortas, L’Her, and Roberge (2007) and Pae and Sabbaghi
(2010). Furthermore, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007) show the strong performance
relative to optimized portfolios. Duchin and Levy (2009) provide a comparison of naive
and Markowitz diversification and show that an equally weighted portfolio may often be
substantially closer to the true mean variance optimality than an optimized portfolio.
On the other hand, Tu and Zhou (2011) propose a combination of naive and sophisti-
cated strategies, including Markowitz optimization, as a way to improve performance, and
conclude that the combined rules not only have a significant impact in improving the
sophisticated strategies, but also outperform the naive rule in most scenarios.
2.3 Correlation neglect
Typically, financial decision makers are faced with not only an analysis of risk and return
profiles of their assets, but also the correlations across different asset returns. It can
however be a challenging task to work with joint distributions of multiple random variables.
Even though a decision maker could in principle adequately analyze the choice variables’
co-movement, he may fail to account for correlation in the decision making process.
Correlation neglect is a cognitive bias by which individuals treat choice options as if
they are independent. This phenomenon has been recently explored in different contexts
in the behavioral economics and bounded rationality literature. It was first documented
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experimentally by Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport (1988), whose experiment participants were
asked to allocate an endowment between assets, where only the correlation between assets
was varied between participants (from -0.8 to 0.8). They found that allocation was not
affected by the treatment. Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) analyze the effect of correlation
neglect on the polarisation of beliefs. DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) study how
it affects the diffusion of information in social networks. Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) and
Levy and Razin (2015) explore the implications for group decision making in political
applications. Recent experimental evidence in Eyster and Weizsa¨cker (2011) shows how
correlation neglect biases choices in an investment portfolio decision problem. Moreover,
the experiment of Kallir and Sonsino (2009) found that subjects neglect correlations in
their allocation decisions, even if it could be shown that they generally noticed the structure
of or the changes in co-movement.
In Section 4 we derive a general result that formalizes the link between preference for
naive diversification and correlation neglect.
3 Theoretical setup
3.1 Preference relation
We adopt the generalized Anscombe-Aumann choice theoretic setup presented by Cerreia-
Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011), where S is a set of states of
the world, Σ is an algebra of subsets of S and X is the set of consequences, which is
assumed to be a convex subset of a vector space, such as the set of lotteries on a set
of prizes. We denote by F the set of simple acts, i.e., functions f : S → X that are
Σ-measurable and with finitely many values. As usual, we identify X with the set of
constant acts in F , i.e., x ∈ X is identified with the constant act x such that x(s) = x
for all s ∈ S. Moreover, for α ∈ [0, 1] and f, g ∈ F , the act α f + (1 − α) g is defined by
(α f + (1− α) g)(s) = α f(s) + (1− α) g(s) for all s ∈ S.
The decision maker’s preferences on F are modeled by a binary relation %, which
induces an indifference relation ∼ on F defined by f ∼ g ⇔ (f % g)∧ (g % f) and a strict
preference relation  on F defined by f  g ⇔ f % g∧¬(f ∼ g). The preference relation
% is a weak order, i.e., satisfies the following properties:
(i) Non-triviality : f, g ∈ F exist such that f  g.
(ii) Completeness : For all f, g ∈ F , f % g ∨ g % f .
(iii) Transitivity : For all f, g, h ∈ F , f % g ∧ g % h⇒ f % h.
Moreover, emulating the majority of frameworks of economic theory, we assume that the
preference relation % is monotone.
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(iv) Monotonicity : For all f, g ∈ F with f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S we have f % g.
Finally, we impose the following two standard additional assumptions:
(v) Risk independence: For x, y, z ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1), x ∼ y =⇒ αx + (1 − α) z ∼
α y + (1− α) z.
(vi) Continuity : For f, g, h ∈ F , the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : α f + (1 − α) g % h} and
{α ∈ [0, 1] : h % α f + (1− α) g} are closed.
In the remainder of the paper a preference relation % is assumed to satisfy properties (i)-
(vi). It is well-known (Herstein and Milnor 1953, Fishburn 1970) that properties (i)-(vi)
imply the existence of a non-constant affine function u : X → R such that
x % y ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y).
Note that for f ∈ F and u as above, u(f) is an element of the set B0(Σ) of real-valued
Σ-measurable simple functions. The dual space of B0(Σ) is the set ba(Σ) of all bounded
finitely additive measures on (S,Σ) and ∆ denotes the set of all probabilities in ba(Σ).
3.2 Choice weights and majorization
We use the theory of majorization from linear algebra to measure the variability of weights
when diversifying across a set of n possible choices. Majorization, which was formally
introduced by Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934), captures the idea that the components
of a weight vector α ∈ Rn are less spread out or more nearly equal than the components
of a vector β ∈ Rn. For any α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn, let
α(1) ≥ · · · ≥ α(n)
denote the components of α in decreasing order, and let
α↓ = (α(1), . . . , α(n))
denote the decreasing rearrangement of α. The weight vector with i-th component equal to
1 and all other components equal to 0 is denoted by ei, and the vector with all components
equal to 1 is denoted by e. We restrict our attention to non-negative weights which sum
to one, that is, α ∈ Sn = {v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Rn+ |∑ni=1 vi = 1}. This means that the
decision maker is assumed to use his full capital and is not taking “inverse” positions such
as shorting in financial economics. Moreover, we will sometimes refers to the set
Sn↓ =
{
v↓ = (v(1), . . . , v(n)) ∈ Rn+ |
n∑
i=1
v(i) = 1
}
.
We now define the notion of majorization:
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Definition 1 (Majorization). For α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn and β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Rn, β is
said to (weakly) majorize α (or, equivalently, α is majorized by β), denoted by β ≥m α,
if
n∑
i=1
αi =
n∑
i=1
βi
and for all k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
k∑
i=1
α(i) ≤
k∑
i=1
β(i) .
Majorization is a preorder on the weight vectors in Sn and a partial order on Sn↓ .
It is trivial but important to note that all vectors in Sn↓ majorize the uniform vector
un = (
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
), since the uniform vector is the vector with minimal differences between
its components.
A key mathematical result in the study of majorization and inequality measurement
is a theorem due to Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1929). It roughly states that a vector
α is majorized by a vector β if and only if α is an averaging of β. This “averaging”
operation is formalized via doubly stochastic matrices.3 A square matrix P is said to be
stochastic if its elements are all non-negative and all rows sum to one. If, in addition to
being stochastic, all columns sum to one, the matrix is said to be doubly stochastic. A
formal definition follows.
Definition 2 (Doubly stochastic matrix). An n×n matrix P = (pij) is doubly stochastic
if pij ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , n, eP = e and Pe′ = e′. We denote by Dn the set of n × n
doubly stochastic matrices.
Theorem 1 (Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1929)). For α,β ∈ Rn, α is majorized by β
if and only if α = βP for some doubly stochastic matrix P .4
An obvious example of a doubly stochastic matrix is the n× n matrix in which every
entry is 1/n, which we shall denote by Pn. Other simple examples are given by the
n × n identity matrix In and by permutation matrices: a square matrix Π is said to
be a permutation matrix if each row and column has a single unit entry with all other
entries being zero. There are n! such matrices of size n × n each of which is obtained by
interchanging rows or columns of the identity matrix. The set Dn of doubly stochastic
matrices is convex and permutation matrices constitute its extreme points.
Use of a special type of doubly stochastic matrix, the so-called T -transform, will be
made in this paper.
3A note on terminology: the term “stochastic matrix” goes back to the large role that they play
in the theory of discrete Markov chains. Doubly stochastic matrices are also sometimes called “Schur
transformations” or “bistochastic”.
4We refer the reader to Schmeidler (1979) for several economic interpretations of Theorem 1, including
decisions under uncertainty and welfare economics.
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Definition 3 (T-transform). A (elementary) T -transform is a matrix that has the form
T = λI + (1 − λ)Π, where λ ∈ [0, 1] and Π is a permutation matrix that interchanges
exactly two coordinates. For α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, αT thus has the form
αT = (α1, . . . , αj−1, λαj + (1− λ)αk, αj+1, . . . , αk−1, λαk + (1− λ)αj, αk+1, . . . , αn) ,
where we assume that the j-th and k-th coordinates of α are averaged.
The importance of T -transforms can be seen from the following result, which is essential
in the proof of Theorem 1 and which we shall utilize in some of the proofs of this article.
Proposition 1 (Muirhead (1903); Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934)). If α ∈ Rn is
majorized by β ∈ Rn, then α can be derived from β by successive applications of a finite
number of T -transforms.
4 Naive diversification preferences
4.1 Classical diversification
An economic agent who chooses to diversify is traditionally understood to prefer variety
over similarity. Axiomatically, preference for diversification is formalized as follows; see
Dekel (1989).
Definition 4 (Preference for diversification). A preference relation % exhibits preference
for diversification if for any f1, . . . , fn ∈ F and α1, . . . , αn ∈ [0, 1] for which
∑n
i=1 αi = 1,
f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn =⇒
n∑
i=1
αi fi % fj for all j = 1, . . . , n.
This definition states that an individual will want to diversify among a collection of
choices all of which are ranked equivalently. The most common example of such diversi-
fication is within the universe of asset markets, where an investor faces a choice amongst
risky assets.
The related notion of convexity of preferences inherently relates to the classic ideal of
diversification, as introduced by Bernoulli (1738). By combining two choices, the decision
maker is ensured under convexity that he is never “worse off” than the least preferred of
these two choices.
Definition 5 (Convex preferences). A preference relation % on F is convex if for all
f, g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1),
f ∼ g =⇒ α f + (1− α) g % f.
Indeed, a preference relation is convex if and only if it exhibits preference for diversifi-
cation. Therefore, preference relations that exhibit preference for diversification coincide
with uncertainty averse preferences, as pointed out by Schmeidler (1989). Moreover, it is
well-known that a preference relation that is represented by a concave utility function is
convex, and that a preference relation is convex if and only if its utility representation is
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quasi-concave. Variations on this classical definition of diversification exist in the liter-
ature (see, for example, Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) and Chateauneuf and Lakhnati
(2007)). We refer to De Giorgi and Mahmoud (2016) for a recent analysis of the classical
definitions of diversification in the theory of choice.
4.2 Naive diversification
We now present an axiomatic formalization of the notion of naive diversification in terms
of preference of equal decision weights over unequal decision weights.
Definition 6 (Preference for naive diversification). A preference relation % exhibits pref-
erence for naive diversification if for n ∈ N, and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈
Sn it follows that:
α ≤m β =⇒
n∑
i=1
αi fi %
n∑
i=1
βi fi for all f1, . . . , fn ∈ F with f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn.
A preference relation % exhibits preference for weak naive diversification if for n ∈ N
and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn it follows that:
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi %
n∑
i=1
αi fi for all f1, . . . , fn ∈ F with f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn.
This definition states that a preference relation % exhibits preference for naive diver-
sification if, for alternatives that are equally ranked, an allocation to these alternatives is
preferred to any alternative weight allocation that majorizes it. In other words, weight
allocations that are closer to equality are always more preferred; see Ibragimov (2009).
We now derive some initial properties of a preference relation % that exhibits preference
for naive diversification:
(1) On naive versus weak naive diversification. Definition 6 implies that 1
n
∑n
i=1 fi %∑n
i=1 αifi for any α ∈ Sn and f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn, because any α ∈ Sn majorizes the equal-
weighted decision vector un =
(
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
)
. It follows that the equal-weighted decision
vector un is the most preferred choice allocation when % exhibits naive diversification
preferences. This means that preference for naive diversification implies preference for
weak naive diversification. However, the converse does not necessarily hold.
(2) On naive diversification and number of alternatives. In general, we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi %
1
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
fi  1
2
(f1 + f2) % f1,
for all n ∈ N and f1, . . . , fn ∈ F such that f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn. This ordering entails the informal
diversification paradigm that more is better, as analyzed by Elton and Gruber (1977), since
an equal weighted allocation to n choices is more preferred to an equal weighted allocation
to m choices if and only if n ≥ m.
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(3) On indifference under naive diversification. Note that choice weights under
naive diversification preferences are equivalent whenever their ordered vectors coincide.
Moreover, whenever a collection of choices are pairwise equally ranked, a convex com-
bination of each of these must be equally ranked. The following formalization of these
observations is hence an immediate consequence of Definition 6.
Lemma 1. Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Sn, f1, . . . , fn ∈ F with
f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn, and g1, . . . , gn ∈ F with g1 ∼ · · · ∼ gn, such that fi ∼ gi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Suppose that % exhibits preference for naive diversification. Then
(i)
∑n
i=1 αi fi ∼
∑n
i=1 βi gi if
∑k
i=1 α(i) =
∑k
i=1 β(i) for all k = 1, . . . , n;
(ii)
∑n
i=1 αi fi ∼
∑n
i=1 αi gi.
(4) On naive diversification and convex preferences. An agent whose preferences
are convex chooses to diversify by taking a convex combination over individual choices
without specifying a preference ordering over choice weights. So the classical notion of
diversification does not necessarily imply preferences for naive diversification. The con-
verse holds however: suppose that % exhibits preferences for naive diversification and
let f1, . . . , fn ∈ F with f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn. Then, for α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, we have∑n
i=1 αifi % fj for all j = 1, . . . , n, since the components of the choice vector α are more
nearly equal than those of ej, i.e., any α ∈ Sn is majorized by ej. This proves the following
result.
Proposition 2. Naive diversification preferences are convex, or, equivalently, exhibit pref-
erences for diversification.
4.3 Permutation invariant preferences
The notion of permutation invariance lies at the core of the definition of naive diversifi-
cation. Permutation invariance captures the idea that the underlying characteristics of
the individual choices are irrelevant in the decision making process. In other words, the
economic agent is indifferent towards a permutation of the components of choice vectors.
We formalize such permutation invariant preferences through permutation matrices. For
a permutation matrix Π and choice vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, we shall write αΠ for
the vector whose components have been shuﬄed using Π and whose i-th component we
denote by (αΠ)i. When ordering the components of αΠ in decreasing order, we denote
its i-th ordered component by (αΠ)(i).
Definition 7 (Permutation invariant preferences). A preference relation % on F is permu-
tation invariant if for all f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ Fn with f1 ∼ · · · ∼ fn, and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈
Sn,
α · f ∼ (αΠ) · f ,
where Π is a permutation matrix.
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The following lemma shows that naive diversification preferences are permutation in-
variant.
Lemma 2. Naive diversification preferences are permutation invariant.
Proof. For all α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn, we have α↓ = (αΠ)↓. Therefore,
∑k
i=1 α(i) =∑k
i=1(αΠ)(i) for all k = 1, . . . , n. By Lemma 1, this implies that α · f ∼ (αΠ) · f .
The significance of permutation invariance manifests itself in its implication for classical
diversification. Indeed, imposing permutation invariance on convex preferences yields
preferences for naive diversification (Proposition 4). We start by showing the weaker
result.
Proposition 3. A preference relation % that is permutation invariant and convex exhibits
preference for weak naive diversification.
Proof. Because any α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn majorizes the vector un, then, according to
Proposition 1, un can be derived from α by successive applications of a finite number of
T -transforms, i.e.,
un = αT1T2 · · ·Tk
where T1, T2, · · ·Tk are T -transforms. For f1, . . . , fn ∈ F , we have:
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi = un · f = (αT1 · · ·Tk) · f .
We prove that (αT1 · · ·Tk) ·f % α ·f by mathematical induction. First of all, we show
that (αT ) · f % α · f when T is T -transform and % is permutation invariant and convex.
Indeed,
(αT ) · f = [α(λ I + (1− λ)Q)] · f = λα · f + (1− α) (αQ) · f
where Q is a permutation matrix. Because % is permutation invariant, then (αQ) · f ∼
α · f . Finally, because % is convex, then
λα · f + (1− λ) (αQ) · f % α · f .
It follow that:
(αT ) · f % α · f .
Now suppose that (αT1 · · ·Tk−1) · f % α · f . Let α˜ = αT1 · · ·Tk−1. It follows that:
(αT1 · · ·Tk) · f = (α˜Tk) · f % α˜ · f = (αT1 · · ·Tk−1) · f % α · f .
Therefore,
(αT1 · · ·Tk) · f % α · f .
This proves the statement of the proposition.
We recall that T -transforms (Definition 3) are averaging operators between two com-
ponents of the original weight vector. This averaging operator is always weakly preferred
under permutation invariant and convex preferences. The proof of Proposition 3 shows
that repeated averaging of two components of a weight vector reaches its limit at the
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equal-weighted decision vector un. Therefore, Proposition 3 can be viewed as a corollary
to Muirhead’s result (Proposition 1).
Another seminal result tangentially related to Proposition 3 appeared in Samuelson
(1967), where the first formal proof of the following, at the time seemingly well-understood,
diversification paradigm is given: “putting a fixed total of wealth equally into independently,
identically distributed investments will leave the mean gain unchanged and will minimize
the variance.” One may hence think of the conditions of having non-negative, independent
and identically distributed random variables in Theorem 1 of Samuelson (1967) being re-
placed by the permutation invariance condition in Proposition 3 to yield an equal weighted
allocation as optimal.5
We next derive the stronger statement, which gives naive diversification under permu-
tation invariance and convexity.
Proposition 4. A preference relation % that is permutation invariant and convex exhibits
preference for naive diversification.
Proof. Suppose that % is permutation invariant and convex. We have to show that α ·f %
β ·f for all f ∈ Fn when β ≥m α. If β ≥m α, then α can be derived from β by successive
applications of a finite number of T -transforms. By applying the same argument as in the
proof of Proposition 3, we have α · f % β · f . Therefore, % exhibits preference for naive
diversification.
Combining Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 with Proposition 4 yields the following equiv-
alence of preferences.
Theorem 2. A monotonic and continuous preference relation % exhibits preference for
naive diversification if and only if it is convex and permutation invariant.
4.4 A geometric characterization
In this subsection, we give a geometric characterization of convex preferences that are
permutation invariant. The characterization relies on classical results from convex analysis
and linear algebra, which we briefly recall first.
A set which is the convex hull of finitely many points is called a polytope. Fix an
allocation vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn. The convex hull of all vectors in Sn obtained
by permutations of the coordinates αi of α is called the permutation polytope Kα of the
vector α:
Kα = conv{αΠ : Π permutation matrix }.
Another polytope of relevance in this discussion is the Birkhoff polytope Bn, which is the
convex hull of the set of all permutation matrices of dimension n. The Birkhoff-von-
Neumann Theorem (Birkhoff 1946) states that every doubly stochastic real matrix is in
5See Hadar and Russell (1969), Hadar and Russell (1971), Tesfatsion (1976) and Li and Wong (1999)
for generalizations of Samuelson’s classical result.
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fact a convex combination of permutation matrices of the same order. The permutation
matrices are then precisely the extreme points of the set of doubly stochastic matrices.
We now reformulate the decision making problem from choice amongst objects in F to
an allocation problem to a given selection of objects f1, . . . , fn ∈ F . That is, faced with n
different objects, a decision maker must decide on an allocation vector in Sn. Permutation
invariance implies indifference amongst all possible permutations of allocation vectors.
The decision maker’s preference relation thus reduces to the majorization preorder ≤m on
Sn. For a given allocation vector α ∈ Sn, consider the contour set
C(α) = {β ∈ Sn : β ≤m α},
which is the set of all antecedents of α in the majorization preordering ≤m. This set
is in fact the permutation polytope of the allocation vector α (Rado 1952), and is thus
generated as the convex hull of points obtained by permuting the components of α. This
means that indifference curves associated with permutation invariance are in fact the
vertices of the permutation polytope Kα = C(α). Consequently, if β ≤m α, so that by
Theorem 1, β = αP for some doubly stochastic matrix P , then there exist constants
ci ≥ 0 with
∑
ci = 1, such that
β = α
(∑
ciΠi
)
=
∑
ci(αΠi),
where the Πi are permutation matrices. This means, as was noted by Rado (1952), that β
lies in the convex hull of the orbit of α under the group of permutation matrices. Figure
1 illustrates indifference curves and associated contour sets for the cases n = 2 and n = 3.
Figure 1: Indifference curves and associated contour sets for the allocation to n = 2 choice
options (left) and n = 3 choice options (right).
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5 Representation
We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions on a utility function U such that the
corresponding preference relation %, with f % g ⇐⇒ U(f) ≥ U(g), exhibits preference
for naive diversification. In particular, we show that naive diversification preferences
arise when decision makers treat choice alternatives as being mixtures of conditionally
independent and identically distributed random variables, with correlation neglect as a
special case.
Our main result so far states that a preference relation exhibits preference for naive
diversification if and only if it is convex and permutation invariant. Cerreia-Vioglio, Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011) provide a characterization for a general class
of preferences that are non-trivial, complete, transitive, monotone, risk independent, con-
tinuous and convex, which are known as uncertainty averse preferences. This means that
naive diversification preferences constitute a subclass of uncertainty averse preferences that
are additionally permutation invariant. We thus build our derivation on the representation
results for uncertainty averse preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Montrucchio (2011).
A preference relation % on F is uncertainty averse if and only if its representation
takes the form
U(f) = inf
Q∈∆
G (EQ [u(f)] ,Q) ,
where u : X → R is non-constant and affine, and G : u(X) × ∆ → (−∞,∞], called
the uncertainty aversion index, is linearly continuous, quasi-convex, increasing in the first
variable with infQ∈∆G(t,Q) = t for t ∈ u(X).
Under this representation, decision makers consider all possible probabilities Q and
the associated expected utilities. They then summarize all these evaluations by taking
their minimum. The function G can be interpreted as an index of uncertainty aversion;
higher degrees of uncertainty aversion correspond to pointwise smaller indices G. The
quasi-convexity of G and the cautious attitude reflected by the minimum derive from the
convexity of preferences, or, equivalently, from preferences for traditional diversification.
Uncertainty aversion is hence closely related to convexity of preferences. Under this for-
malization, convexity reflects a basic negative attitude of decision makers towards the
presence of uncertainty in their choices.
Now, we assume that decision makers exclusively form convex combinations of non-
constant acts from an infinite sequence f = (f1, f2, . . . )
T in F . This means that choice
alternatives are elements of the convex hull conv{f1, f2, . . . } of {f1, f2, . . . }. This assump-
tion hold for example when the set of consequences is a convex subset of a vector space
with countable basis.6
The following definition will play a central role in our main representation result:
6With some abuse of notation we consider the infinite sequence f = (f1, f2, . . . )
T as a vector of acts
with values in X∞.
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Definition 8 (Exchangeability). Let Q ∈ ∆. An infinite sequence wT = (w1, w2, . . . ) of
elements in B0(Σ) is said to be Q-exchangeable if and only if w has the same distribution
under Q as Π w for any permutation matrix Π ∈ R∞ × R∞ that only permutes a finite
number of elements of w.
A well-known result on exchangeable sequences is de Finetti’s theorem, which states
that an infinite sequence is exchangeable if and only if it corresponds to a mixture of
independent and identically distributed sequences (Aldous 1985). Formally, we first define
random measures as follows:
Definition 9 (Random measure). The function ν : S × B(R) → R+, where B(R) is the
Borel σ-algebra on R, is a random measure if ν(s, ·) is a probability measure on (R,B(R))
for all S ∈ S and ν(·, A) is a random variable on (S,Σ) for all A ∈ B(R).
The following result holds:
Lemma 3 (de Finetti). An infinite sequence w = (w1, w2, . . . ) of elements in B0(Σ) is
Q-exchangeable if and only if a random measure ν exists such that:
(1) w1, w2, . . . are conditionally independent given G, i.e.,
Q [wi ∈ Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n|G] =
n∏
i=1
Q [wi ∈ Ai|G] , A1, . . . , An ∈ B(R), n ≥ 1;
and
(2) the conditional distribution of xi given G is ν, i.e.,
Q [wi ∈ Ai|G] = ν(·, Ai), Ai ∈ B(R), i = 1, 2, . . .
where G is the σ-algebra generated by the family of random variables (ν(·, A))A∈B(R).
Following the result of Lemma 3, we say that an exchangeable infinite sequence of
elements in B0(Σ) is a mixture of i.i.d. sequences dictated by a random measure ν. An
immediate implication of Lemma 3 is that any two terms of an exchangeable infinite
sequence have zero conditional correlation:
Corollary 1 (Exchangeability and correlation neglect). Let w = (w1, w2, . . . ) be a Q-
exchangeable infinite sequence in B0(Σ) dictated by the random measure ν. It follows
that:
ρQ(xi, xj|G) = 0
where G is the σ-algebra generated by the family of random variables (ν(·, A))A∈B(R).
Note that the (unconditional) correlation of any two terms in an exchangeable infinite
sequence does not have to be zero, as illustrated in the following example.
To see the link between exchangeability and correlation neglect, consider the following
example. Let m, s ∈ B0(Σ) and w = (w1, w2, . . . )T be a sequence of independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables in B0(Σ) under probability measure Q ∈ ∆. Define
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vi = m + swi for i = 1, 2, . . . . It follows that v = (v1, v2, . . . ) is Q-exchangeable. Indeed,
conditioning on m and s, v1, v2, . . . are independent and identically distributed. Clearly,
conditioning on m and s, the correlation between any two random variables vi and vj for
i 6= j is equal to zero. However, (unconditionally) vi and vj for i 6= j are not independent
and in general also not identically distributed.
We now present our main representation result.
Theorem 3 (Representation of naive-diversification preferences). Let f = (f1, f2, . . . )
T
be an infinite sequence of non-constant acts in F from which the decision maker forms
convex combinations. Then a preference relation on conv{f1, f2, . . . } exhibits preference
for naive diversification if and only if its utility representation is given by
U(f) = inf
Q∈∆
Ge (EQ [u(f)] ,Q) ,
where u : X → R is affine and Ge : u(X) × ∆ → (−∞,∞] is an index of uncertainty
aversion with Ge(Q, ·) =∞ for Q ∈ ∆ \∆e and ∆e ⊂ ∆ is the set of probability measures
Q on (S,Σ) such that (u(f1), u(f2), . . . )T is a mixture of i.i.d. sequences dictated by some
random measure ν under Q.
Proof. One direction directly follows from Lemma 3. Let f˜ = (fi1 , . . . , fin)
T and u(f˜) =
(u(fi1), . . . , u(fin))
T where ij ≥ 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n and ij 6= ik for j 6= k. Because for
any α ∈ Sn and any n× n permutation matrix Π we have:
u(αΠ · f˜) = αΠ · u(f˜) = α · Πu(f˜)
then according to Lemma 3, u(αΠ · f˜) as the same distribution as u(α · f˜) under any
probability measure Q ∈ ∆e. Therefore, for
U(f) = inf
Q∈∆
Ge (EQ [u(f)] ,Q)
we have:
U(αΠ · f˜) = U(α · f˜)
for any α ∈ Sn and any f˜ . It follows that the preference relation represented by U is
convex and permutation invariant and thus exhibits preference for naive diversification.
The other direction works as follows. Suppose that % is convex and permutation
invariant. For any α ∈ Sn and any f˜ = (fi1 , . . . , fin)T and u(f˜) = (u(fi1), . . . , u(fin))T
where ij ≥ 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n and ij 6= ik for j 6= k, we have:
α · f˜ ∼ (αΠ) · f˜
For any n × n permutation matrix Π. As this must also apply to constant acts, in this
case we have,
u(α · f˜) = u
(
(αΠ) · f˜
)
⇔ α · u(f˜) = (αΠ) · u(f˜) = α · (Πu(f˜))⇔ α ·
(
u(f˜)− Πu(f˜)
)
= 0.
for any n× n permutation matrix Π and any α ∈ Sn. It follows that
u(f˜) = Πu(f˜)
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for any n × n permutation matrix Π and any n ≥ 1. For general acts, the equality is
in distribution and this is violated if (u(f1), u(f2), . . . ) is not exchangeable. Therefore,
in the representation of % we can limit the set of measures in ∆ to those under which
(u(f1), u(f2), . . . ) is exchangeable.
The utility of naive diversification preferences thus represents uncertainty averse pref-
erences with the additional requirement that decision makers only consider beliefs that
imply some weak form of independence. Therefore, naive diversification is closely related
to correlation neglect. However, the latter is a much stronger condition under which naive
diversification arises.
We end this Section with a simple example illustrating the connection between naive
diversification and correlation neglect. Consider three non-degenerate normally and iden-
tically distributed random variables x1, x2, and x3 representing payoffs to assets, where
x3 is independent of x1 and x2, but with x1 and x2 perfectly negatively correlated, that is,
ρ(x1, x2) = −1. For any risk-averse investor with preferences represented by the relation
%,
1
2
(x1 + x2) %
1
3
(x1 + x2 + x3).
This is because allocating equally to perfect-negatively correlated choices is risk-free,
whereas 1
3
(x1 + x2 + x3) is not, although both have the same mean. However, under
our formalization of preferences for naive diversification, the distribution on the right
weakly dominates the one on the left. In other words, naive diversifiers ignore correlations
among assets and this may lead to indifference to mean-preserving spreads and thus to a
preference for second-degree stochastically dominated alternatives.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provided mathematically and economically sound choice theoretic foun-
dations for the naive approach to diversification. In particular, we axiomatized naive
diversification by defining it as a preference for equality over inequality, and showed that
the notion of permutation invariance lies at the core of naive diversification. Moreover,
we derived necessary and sufficient conditions on the utility functions that give rise to
preferences for naive diversification by showing that naive diversification preferences arise
when decision makers only consider beliefs that imply some weak form of independence,
which is closely related to correlation neglect.
The theory of majorization underlying the formalization of naive diversification pref-
erences and their representation is a rich theory that lends itself to wider extensions going
beyond the axiomatization and representation results of this paper. Appendices A.2 and
A.3 give an overview of two potentially useful extensions of our theory, namely comparison
of levels of naive diversification and rebalancing of allocation to equality.
We conclude by briefly discussing the relationship between our axiomatic system and
observed behavior in reality, followed by sketching choice theoretic extensions of our work.
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6.1 Testing the reality of naive diversification
Even though desirability for diversification is a cornerstone of a broad range of portfolio
choice models, the precise formal definition differs from model to model. Analogously,
the way in which the notion of diversification is interpreted and implemented in the real
world varies greatly. Traditional diversification paradigms are consistently violated in
practice. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that economic agents often choose diver-
sification schemes other than those implied by Markowitz’s portfolio theory or expected
utility theory. Diversification heuristics thus span a vast range, and naive diversification,
in particular, has been widely documented both empirically and experimentally.
However, despite the growing literature pointing to the common existence of naive
diversification in practice, experimental research investigating the behavioral drivers of
diversifiers remains rather limited. Our axiomatization can help empirical and experimen-
tal economists test diversification preferences, and their underlying drivers, of economic
agents in the real world. In particular, we can now look for the main parameters driving
the decision process of naive diversifiers. One such parameter or heuristic implied by our
axiomatization is that of permutation invariance. In practice, it is arguably rather rare
that a diversifier would know so little about the given assets to be essentially indifferent
among them. Despite this, naive diversification continues to be applied by both experi-
enced professionals and regular people. By varying the amount of information available to
subjects in an experimental setting, one may be able to deduce whether the indifference
axiom applies in general or whether it is information dependent, as implied by Laplace’s
principle of indifference. Another insight gained through our axiomatization was that of
consistency with traditional convex diversification and concave expected utility maximiza-
tion. In particular, consider that a risk averse investor would in theory be expected to
diversify in the traditional convex sense. Hence, the level of risk aversion may be yet
another parameter driving naive diversification, and this again can be directly tested.
6.2 Choice-theoretic generalizations
Comparing allocations among different numbers of choices. Our discussion of
naive diversification throughout has focused on a fixed number of choice alternatives n.
Suppose that an economic agent is faced with an allocation among either f = (f1, . . . , fn)
or g = (g1, . . . , gm), where n 6= m. In Section 3, we showed that an equal allocation
among a larger number of alternatives is always more preferred under naive diversification.
More generally, however, given unequal choice weights α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn and β =
(β1, . . . , βm) ∈ Sm and allocations α ·f and β · g, one can cannot infer a preference of one
over the other without generalizing the naive diversification axiom. Such an extension has
been developed by Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011) in the context of the majorization
order on vectors of unequal lengths. In fact, they showed that the components of α are
less spread out than the components of β if and only if the Lorenz curve Lα associated
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with the vector α is greater or equal than the Lorenz curve Lβ associated with β for all
values in its domain [0, 1], and that this is equivalent to requiring that 1/n
∑n
i=1 φ(αi) ≤
1/m
∑m
i=1 φ(βi) for all convex functions φ : R→ R.
Multidimensional diversification. One may think of naive diversification as being
univariate, in the sense that a naive diversifier is concerned with only one dimension,
namely that of equality of choice weights. Suppose that an economic agent would like
to diversify naively, but would also like to reduce variability along a second dimension.
Consider for example the dimension of “risk weights” as opposed to “capital weights”.
This is a commonly applied risk diversification strategy in practice, known under risk
parity. Parity diversification focuses on allocation of risk, usually defined as volatility,
rather than allocation of capital. Here, risk contributions across choice alternatives are
equalized (and are in practice typically levered to match market levels of risk). It can be
viewed as a middle ground between the naive approach and the minimum risk approach
(see for example Maillard, Roncalli, and Teiletche (2010)).
When allocations along more than one dimension are to be compared simultaneously,
we move from the linear space of choice vectors to the space of choice matrices. Each row
of a choice matrix represents a particular attribute or dimension, whereas each column
represents the choice weights along that dimension. The generalization of the mathemati-
cal formalism of naive diversification is then straightforward. For example, a choice matrix
X is more diversified (along some given dimensions) than a choice matrix Y if X = PY
for some doubly stochastic matrix P . This definition is part of an established field within
linear algebra known as multivariate majorization.
Towards an inequality aversion coefficient. The naive diversification axiom implies
that a weight allocation that is closest to the equal weighted vector un is always more
preferred. This in turn induces the idea of being averse to inequality, which we discussed
in Section 4. One may formalize this notion, together with a characterization of different
levels of inequality aversion as follows.
First, yet another generalization of naive diversification can be obtained by substituting
a more general vector d ∈ Sn for the equality vector un. In that case, weight allocations
closest to d are preferred. To do this, we need to define the concept of d-stochastic matrix.
For d ∈ Sn, an n×n matrix A = (aij) is said to be d-stochastic if (i) aij ≥ 0 for all i, j ≤ n;
(ii) dA = d; and (iii) Au′n = u
′
n. To get an intuition for d-stochastic matrices, note that
since
∑n
i=1 di = 1 by construction, a d-stochastic matrix in our setting can be viewed as
the transition matrix of a Markov chain. Clearly, when d = un, a d-stochastic matrix is
doubly stochastic. One can then say that a preference relation % exhibits preference for
relative naive diversification if there is a weight allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Sn such that
for any α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sn and β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Sn,
α ≤m β ⇐⇒ α = βA
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for some d-stochastic matrix A. The interpretation here is that an individual with naive
diversification preferences relative to some d 6= un is less averse to inequality than one
with naive diversification preferences.
To be then able to compare levels of aversion to inequality within relative naive di-
versification preferences, we can introduce the coefficient of inequality aversion. For naive
diversification preferences relative to d ∈ Sn, the corresponding inequality aversion co-
efficient ε is defined as ε = ‖d− un‖, where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm taken up-to-
permutation. Clearly, this inequality aversion coefficient ε lies within [0,∞), with ε = 0
for naive diversification preferences, in which case we can say that the decision maker
possesses absolute aversion to inequality.
A Appendix
A.1 Measures of naive diversification
An evaluation of the optimality of a given choice allocation of a naive diversifier essentially
reduces to a measure of inequality of the decision weights of his choice. Measures of in-
equality arise in various disciplines within economic theory, particularly within the context
of wealth and income. Indeed, there is a vast literature on diversity and inequality indices
in economics — see classical discussions and surveys by Sen (1973), Szal and Robinson
(1977), Dalton (1920), Atkinson (1970), Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), and Kra¨mer
(1998). Most of these indices have been developed primarily based on foundations of the
concept of social welfare, and hence may not necessarily be applicable to our setting.
Since a measure of inequality strongly depends on the context, we provide an axioma-
tization that is consistent with our definition of preference for naive diversification, which
has a precise mathematical formulation in terms of majorization and Schur-concave func-
tions. Many existing indices measuring allocation optimality or inequality are qualitative
in nature focused on ranking with no indication of a quantification of the comparison. We
do not only seek a qualitative ranking of choice allocations, but we aim to quantify the
distance between two weight allocations. The resulting measure hence indicates how far
from optimality a given choice allocation is and allows for comparison of two non-equal
choice allocations in terms of their distance.
Let % be a preference relation on F exhibiting preferences for naive diversification. To
derive the qualitative and quantitative properties that are consistent with naive diversi-
fication, we fix the optimal choice allocation un = (
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) for a given n and look at
comparisons with respect to this vector. The following are the minimal requirements that
a measure µn : F → R of naive diversification should satisfy:
(A1) Positivity: For all f ∈ F , µn(f) ≥ 0.
(A2) Normality: For all f ∈ F , µn(f) = 0 if and only if f ∼ un · f for some f =
(f1, . . . , fn).
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(A3) Boundedness: For all f ∈ F , µn(f) <∞.
(A4) Representation: For all f, g ∈ F , f % g implies µn(f) ≥ µn(g).
(A5) Permutation invariance: Forα = (α1, . . . , αn),β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Sn and f1, . . . , fn ∈
F , if ∑ni=1 αifi % ∑ni=1 βifi and α 6= Πβ for any permutation matrix Π, then
µn(
∑n
i=1 αifi) > µn(
∑n
i=1 βifi).
Axioms A1, A2, and A3 essentially ensure that the function µn is a well-behaved prob-
ability metric (Rachev, Stoyanov, and Fabozzi 2011) and hence an analytically sound mea-
sure of the distance between two random quantities. Axiom A4 implies Schur-concavity
and thus that the qualitative ranking is preserved. By introducing invariance under per-
mutation (Axiom A5), we require strict Schur-concavity. This distinguishes equivalence,
and hence a zero distance from equality, from a strict preference ordering of choice weights,
which should give a strictly positive distance.
Some well-known classes of measures from statistics, economics and asset management
that satisfy the above axioms include statistical dispersion measures, economic inequality
indices, such as the Gini coefficient (Gini 1921), Dalton’s measure (Dalton 1920) and
Atkinson’s measure (Atkinson 1970), and diversification indices such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (Hirschman 1964) and the Simpson diversity index (Simspon 1949).
A.2 Rebalancing to equality
Based on Theorem 1 of Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1929), a doubly stochastic matrix
can be thought of as an operation between two weight allocations leading towards greater
equality in the weight vector. With this in mind, we define a rebalancing transform to
be a doubly stochastic matrix. Clearly, rebalancing in this context cannot yield a less
diversified allocation. In other words, applying a rebalancing transform to a vector of
decision weights is equivalent to averaging the decision weights.
In this Section, we characterize such transforms which start with a suboptimal weight
allocation
∑n
i=1 αifi and produce equality
1
n
∑n
i=1 fi in terms of their implied turnover
in practice. Our analysis is focused on the asset allocation problem, where rebalancing
is understood in terms of buying and selling positions. However, this discussion can be
generalized to characterize transforms in the context of reallocation of wealth, such as
Dalton’s principle of transfers.
Starting from an allocation α ∈ Sn, there are, in general, more than one possible
transforms that rebalance α to un or, more generally, to an allocation β ∈ Sn that is
closer to equality. Given two weight allocations α,β ∈ Sn with α majorized by β, the set
Ωα≤mβ = {P ∈ Dn | α = βP}
is referred to as the rebalancing polytope of the orderα ≤m β.7 The set Ωα≤mβ is nonempty,
compact and convex. In the case that the components of β are simply a rearrangement of
7Within the linear algebra literature, this set is referred to as the “majorization polytope”. As pointed
out by Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011), very little is known about this polytope.
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the components of α, then Ωα≤mβ contains one unique permutation matrix. In general,
however, Ωα≤mβ contains more than one element.
Now, for λ ∈ Sn, we have un ≤m λ, and so our focus henceforth is the set
Ωn,λ := Ωun≤mλ = {P ∈ Dn | un = λP} .
It contains all rebalancing transformations that lead to an equal allocation. In particular,
it includes the matrix Pn with all entries equal to 1/n.
We are interested in rebalancing a weight allocation towards equality in practice. How-
ever, it is not clear how or why one would choose one transform in a given polytope Ωn,λ
over another. We provide a precise distinction in terms of turnover. In the context of asset
allocation, the particular rebalancing transform applied to rebalance one weight allocation
to another has an interpretation in terms of the fraction of assets bought and sold and,
consequently, in terms of the implied transaction costs.
Definition 10 (Turnover). For λ ∈ Sn, the turnover vector τ (λ) corresponding to rebal-
ancing λ to equality un is given by τ (λ) = λ − un, and the resulting turnover τ(λ) is
defined by τ(λ) = 1
2
∑n
i=1 |τi|, where τi are the components of the turnover vector τ (λ).
The turnover is intuitively equal to the portion of the total decision weights that
would have to be redistributed by taking from weights exceeding 1/n and assigning these
portions to weights that are less than 1/n. The turnover hence always lies between 0
and 1. Graphically, it can be represented as the longest vertical distance between the
Lorenz curve associated with a choice vector, and the diagonal line representing perfect
equality. Note the similarities between Definition 10 and the Hoover Index (Hoover 1936),
a measure of income metrics which is also known as the Robin Hood Index, as uniformity
is achieved in a population by taking from the richer half and giving to the poorer half.
Lemma 4. Let λ ∈ Sn and Ωn,λ = {P ∈ Dn | un = λP}. Then for all P ∈ Ωn,λ,
λ(In − P ) = τ (λ) .
Proof. The equation follows by definition, as λ(In − P ) = λ− λP = λ− un = τ (λ).
Based on Definition 10, every transformation P ∈ Ωn,λ applied to λ theoretically yields
the same turnover. However, there is a subtle difference. In practice, some rebalancing
transformations imply a higher practical turnover than the theoretical turnover of Defi-
nition 10. This is because more assets are bought or sold than is theoretically needed to
obtain equality. In simple cases where there are only 2 or 3 possible choices, choosing a
transformation that minimizes turnover is straightforward. However, for larger collections,
the choice of the optimal rebalancing transformation may not be obvious.
We refer to the actual turnover induced in practice as the practical turnover.
Definition 11 (Practical turnover). Let λ ∈ Sn. For P ∈ Ωn,λ, the practical turnover is
given by τ˜P (λ) = τ(λ) ‖P − In‖, where ‖·‖ is the Frobenius norm taken up-to-permutation.8
8For a m× n matrix A = (aij), the Frobenious norm is defined as ‖A‖ =
√∑m
i=1
∑′
j=1 n|aij |2.
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The practical turnover is thus determined in terms of the distance of the corresponding
rebalancing transform from the identity transform (up-to-permutation). The idea is that
the closer one is to the identity transform, the smaller the changes that are applied to the
entries of the choice vector.
Proposition 5. Let λ 6= un ∈ Sn. For P ∈ Ωn,λ = {P ∈ Dn | un = λP}, denote by
τ˜(λ) = {τ˜P (λ) | P ∈ Ωn,λ} the set of all possible practical turnovers. Then
inf (τ˜(λ)) = τ(λ) .
In other words, the smallest possible practical turnover is the theoretical turnover.
Proof. We will show that ‖P − In‖ ≥ 1 for all P ∈ Ωn,λ. Note that we obtain the smallest
possible norm if all rows of P and In coincide up to permutation, except for two rows, say
i and j. In other words, all entries of λ and un coincide (up to permutation) apart from
the i-th and j-th entries that need to be averaged out to give 1/n each. Because P is a
doubly stochastic matrix, the entries of both rows i and j must be some a ∈ (0, 1) and
1−a. Consequently, ‖P − In‖ =
√
2a2 + 2(1− a)2 and its minimum is reached at a = 1/2,
implying that the smallest possible norm is equal to ‖P − In‖ =
√
4(1/2)2 = 1.
To characterize the rebalancing transform that would yield the theoretical turnover,
and thus by Proposition 5 the smallest possible practical turnover, we use the notion of
T -transform (Definition 3). Recall that in the economic context of equalizing wealth or
income, T -transforms are also known as Dalton or Robin Hood transfers and are interpreted
as the operation of shifting income or wealth from one individual to a relatively poorer
individual. The following observation follows directly from the proof of Proposition 5.
Corollary 2. Suppose one can transform λ ∈ Sn to equality un directly through a single
T -transform, i.e. T ∈ Ωn,λ. Then ‖T − In‖ = 1.
Also recall that according to Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934) (Proposition 1), if
a vector α ∈ Sn is majorized by another vector β ∈ Sn, then α can be derived from β by
successive applications of at most n− 1 such T -transforms. Therefore, every rebalancing
polytope Ωn,λ contains (not necessarily unique) products of T -transforms. In Example
??, P (0, 0) is itself a T -transform. Such successive applications of T -transforms do indeed
produce the least possible turnover, that is the theoretical turnover. The following is an
immediate consequence of the proof of Proposition 5 and the proof of Lemma 2, p.47 of
Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934).
Proposition 6. Let λ 6= un ∈ Sn. Then
inf (τ˜(λ)) = τ˜Q(λ) ,
where Q ∈ Ωn,λ is a product of at most n− 1 T -transforms.
Corollary 3. For λ 6= un ∈ Sn and the rebalancing polytope Ωn,λ, the minimum distance
from identity In of any rebalancing transform P ∈ Ωn,λ is a product of T -transforms.9
9Based on a private correspondence with the authors of Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011), the
problem of characterizing the closest element to an identity matrix within a given polytope has not
been tackled in linear algebra. Our characterization through T -transforms can hence be of interest to
mathematicians and economists working with inequalities and the theory of majorization in general.
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